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COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, Appellant, v. J. A. McCLURKEN 
et al., Respondents. 
Zoning Existing Nonconforming Uses.- The utilization of 
four new storage tanks increasing storage tank ca-
more than five times is not a mere continuance of an 
nonconforming use which, when exempted by a zoning 
ordinance, consisted of the intermittent storage of lumber and 
scrap metal, preliminary grading, steel beam storage and the 
use of movable gasoline storage tanks. 
[2) !d.-Enlargement of Nonconforming Use.-Even if new gaso-
line storage tanks are utilized for an original nonconforming 
industrial use exempted by a zoning ordinance, they constitute 
an unwarranted enlargement of such nonconforming use con-
sisting of the intermittent storage of lumber and scrap metal, 
preliminary grading, steel beam storage and use of movable 
gasoline storage tanks, where the new storage capacity is more 
than five times the old, the tanks are double the size of the 
largest original and are permanently affixed in a residential 
zone. 
[3] Id.- New Nonconforming Use.- The utilization of gasoline 
storage tanks as an incident to a service station erected after 
adoption of a zoning ordinance is not merely the expansion 
of a previously existing nonconforming use, consisting of the 
utilization of smaller movable storage tanks for supplying 
power incident to industrial use, but is a new use. 
[4) !d.-Continuance of Nonconforming Use.--The continuance of 
a nonconforming use permitted by a zoning ordinance is a 
continuance of the same use. 
[5] !d.-Enlargement of Nonconforming Use.-It would be an un-
warranted discrimination in favor of certain property owners 
to permit them, by enlarging their permitted nonconforming 
use, to construct gasoline storage tanks in a residential zone 
in which they are prohibited. 
[6] Id.- Structural Alterations.- Construction of new storage 
tanks in a residential zone is prohibited by an ordinance for-
bidding structural alterations of a building used for a permitted 
nonconforming use, since such tanks are buildings within the 
ordinance and a prohibition of structural alterations, although 
not precluding routine repair and maintenance, does preclude 
erection of new buildings. 
See 12 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr. Supp. 160; 58 Am.Jur. 1021. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-12] Zoning. 
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running south from the C-1 zone for an additional 330 feet; 
and a residential district, R-2-A, south from the 
C-1 zone, which included one third of defendants' land. 
In 1948 defendants erected a retail station near 
the intersection of Broadway and Massachusetts A venue. The 
service station was within the area zoned for retail 
which permitted that use. Defendants also erected four tanks 
to provide storage facilities for the service station. Ll\lthough 
the tanks are near the service station, they extend approxi-
mately 50 feet within the area zoned for residences. Before 
1942 steel beams and trusses had been stored on this corner 
and there was a preliminary leveling of the land and a service 
road made thereon. There is no disagreement among any of 
the witnesses, however, that until the tanks in question were 
erected there were no permanent structures of any kind on 
this corner before or after 1942. 
The trial court concluded that the tanks were permitted 
under a provision of the ordinance exempting nonconforming 
uses existing at the time of its adoption. 
Section 17 of Ordinance 371, incorporated by reference in 
Ordinance 268 (New Series) provides: 
"The lawful use of land existing at the time of the passage 
of this ordinance, although such use does not conform to the 
provisions hereof, may be continued; if such nonconforming 
use is discontinued any future use of said land shall be in 
conformity with the provisions of this ordinance.'' 
Such a provision is ordinarily included in zoning ordi-
nances because of the hardship and doubtful constitutionality 
of compelling the immediate discontinuance of nonconforming 
uses. (See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304 [295 
P. 14].) "The object of such a provision is the gradual elimi-
nation of the nonconforming use by obsolescence or destruc-
tion by fire or the elements, and it has been frequently upheld 
by the courts." (Rehfeld v. San Prancisco, 218 Cal. 83, 84 
[21 P.2d 419].) There is a growing tendency to guard against 
the indefinite continuance of nonconforming uses by providing 
for their liquidation within a prescribed period. (See 35 
Va.L.Rev. 348, 356; Standard O£l Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 
183 F.2d 410, 413, cert. den., 340 U.S. 892 [71 S.Ct. 208, 
95 L.Ed. 647] ; State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 
168 La. 172 [121 So. 613], cert. den. 280 U.S. 556 [50 S.Ct. 
16, 74 L.Ed. 612]; State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 
168 La. 752 [123 So. 314].) 
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Given the of zoning to eliminate nonconforming 
uses, eomts throughout the country generally follow a strict 
against their extension or enlargement.1 
[1] rrhe evidence most favorable to defendants is that in 
their usc they utilized fuel tanks that were 
skid timbers from place to place as they 
were JwedecL One tank had a capacity of 1,200 gallons, an-
other and the largest a capacity of 6,000 gallons. 
have four new tanks with a capacity of 
each, that are 32 feet high and 8 feet in 
diameter and are permanently located upon a rectangular 
concrete base 10 feet wide and 54 feet long. In erecting 
four new tanks double the size of the largest of the old, 
defendants ha Ye not only increased their fuel storage capacity 
more than :five times but have permanently affixed the tanks 
within the area zoned for residences. Such a formidable ex-
pansion can hardly be viewed as a mere continuance of the 
nonconforming use consisting of the intermittent storage of 
'Rehfeld v. San Francisco, 218 Cal. 83, 85 [21 P.2d 419]; Burke v. 
Cit!! of Los Angeles, 68 Cal.App.2d 189, 191 [156 P.2d 28]; Yuba City v. 
Cherniavsky, 117 Cal.App. i368, 573 [4 P.2d 299]; Wilson v. Edgar, 64 
Cal.App. 634, 607 [222 P. 623]; De Felice v. East Haven, 130 Conn. 156 
[32 A.2d 635, 147 A.L.R. 161]; Piccolo v. West Haven, 120 Conn. 449 
I HiJ A. 610, 617]; Thayer v. Board of Appeals, 114 Conn. 15 [157 A. 
273, 276]; Ware v. Wichita, 118 Kan. 265 [234 P. 978]; Goodrich v. 
Sclligman, 298 Ky. 803 [183 S.W.2d 625, 627]; Dorman v. Baltimore, 
187 :\1d. G7S [ii1 A.2d 638, 661]; Colati v. Jirout, 186 Md. 652 [47 A.2d 
613, 615·61G]; Beyer v. Mayor and City of Baltimore, 182 Md. 444 
[34 A.:Cd 765, 769]; Connors v. Town of Burlington (1950), Mass. 
[!ll N.E.2d 212, 213]; Inspector of Bldgs. of Burlington v. Murphy, 320 
:Yiass. 207 f 68 N.E.2d 918, 919]; Town of B arlington v. Dunn, 318 Mass. 
21G [61 N.E.2d 243, 247, 168 A.L.R. 1181]; Town of Marblehead v. 
Rosenthal, 31G :\lass. 124 [:'i5 N.E.2d 13]; Town of Lexington v. Bean, 
272 Mass. 547 fl72 N.E. 867, 870]; Cole v. City of Battle Creelc, 298 
Mich. 9S [298 N.W. 466, 468]; Austin v. Older, 283 :Mich. 667 [278 N.W. 
727, 720]; TVo1nen's Christian Ass'n. of Kansas City v. Brown, 354 
l\Io. 700 [190 S.W.2d 900, 906]; In re Botz, 236 l\fo.App. 566 [159 
S.W.2d 367, 371-373]; Lynch v. Borough of H'illsdale, 136 N . .J.L. 129 
[54 A.2d 723, 725-726]; Albright v. Johnson, 135 N . .J.h 70 [50 A.2d 
399]; Bunnorc Co. v. Smith, 124 N . .J.L. 541 [12 A.2d 353, 356]; Home 
Fuel Oil Co. v. Glen Rock, 118 N . .J.L. 340 [192 A. 516, 518]; De Vito v. 
Pearsall, 115 N . .J.L. 323 [ISO A. 202]; Conaway v. Atlantic City, 107 
N . .J.L. 404 [154 A. 6]; Village of Ossining v. Meredith, 73 N.Y.S.2d 
897; People v. Giorgi, 16 N.Y.S.2d 923; Pisicchio v. Board of Appeals, 
16.3 Misc. Jil6 [300 N.Y.S. 368, 3691; State ex rel. City Ice g. Fuel Co. v. 
Stegner, 120 Ohio St. 418 [166 N.E. 226, 227, 64 A.L.R. 916]; Appeal 
of Kiddy, 294 Pa. 209 P43 A. 909); Appeal of Yocom, 142 Pa. Super. 
165 [15 A.2d 687, 689-69.0]; Meserolo v. Board of .Adjustment, City of 
Dallas, ('rex. Civ. App.) 172 S.W.2d 528, 530-531; Benjamin v. Lietz, 
--·Utah--- [211 P.2d 449, 451]; see 147 A.L.R. 167; 8 McQuillin, 
Municipal Corporations, 3d ed. 1950, § 25.183, pp. 366-367. 
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industrial use had been reached. [7] The purpose of the 
landovvner in purchasing the property must yield to the pub-
lic interest in the enforcement of a comprehensive* zoning 
plan. (Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal.2d 332, 
337 [ 171 P .2d 542] ; Acker v. Baldwin, 18 Cal.2d 341, 344 
[115 P.2d 455]; 81mny Slope Water Co. v. City of Pasadena, 
1 Cal.2d 87, 93-94 [33 P.2d 672) ; cf. Skalko v. City Sunny-
vale, 14 Cal.2d 213, 215 [93 P.2d 93] .) [8] The intention to 
expand the business in the future does not give defendants 
the right to expand a nonconforming use. (Town of Billerica v. 
Quinn, 320 Mass. 687 [71 N.E.2d 235, 236] ; Chayt v. Board 
of Zoning Appeals of Balthnore City, 17 Mel. 426 [9 A.2d 747, 
750) ; Appeal of Kiddy, S1(pra, note 1.) The ordinance has 
made allowance for the continuance of nonconforming uses 
existent in 1942 ; it does not permit the enlargement of such 
uses as the owners find expansion desirable. It is immaterial 
that a property owner in an area zoned for residential pur-
poses contemplated the maximum commercial utilization of 
his property previous to the zoning ordinance. (Sunny Slope 
1Yater Co. v. City of Pasadena, 1 Cal.2d 87, 95 [33 P.2d 672); 
O'Rourke v. 1'eeter·s, 63 Cal.App.2d 349, 352 [146 P.2d 983]; 
Marblehead Land Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 36 F.2d 242, 
244; 47 F.2d 528, 534, cert. den. 284 U.S. 634 [52 S.Ct. 18, 
76 L.Ed. 540]; Ware v. City of Wichita, 113 Kan. 153 [214 
P. 99] ; Spector v. B1iilding Inspector of Milton, 250 Mass. 63 
[145 N.E. 265] ; Chayt v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Balti-
more City, snpra.) Although defendants are confined in their 
nonconforming use to the activities carried on at the time 
their property was zoned, they enjoy a favored position com-
pared to those who purchased property for a nonconforming 
use and were prevented from using it at all for that purpose 
because their proprrty was zoned before they could establish 
such a use. 
Defrndants rely on In re Smith, 143 Cal. 368 [77 P. 180] 
and Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 224 [25 S.Ct. 18, 
49 L.Ed. 169]. In the Smith case the gas works had been 
erected before the passage of the ordinance. It exemplifies 
the rule that a lawful use existing at the time a zoning ordi-
nance becomes effective cannot be prohibited when it is not a 
public nuisance. In the Dobbins case the owner undertook 
construction of a gas works in a permitted area and expended 
some $2,500 in erecting the foundation before a zoning ordi-
nance was passed prohibiting gas works in that district. 
CouNTY oF SAN Dmoo JYicCLURKEN 691 
[37 C.2d 683; 234 P.2d 9721 
[9] If an owner has legally undertaken the construction of 
a building before the effective date of a zoning ordinance, he 
may complete the building and use it for the purpose designed 
after the effective date of the ordinance. (City of Coldwater v. 
Williams Oil 288Mich. 140 [284 N.W. 675]; Best & Co. v. 
Garden 286 N.Y.S. 980, aff'd. 
27:3 N.Y. 564 [7 N.E.2d 694] .) Protection of an undertaking 
involving the investment of capital, the purchase of equip-
ment, and the employment of workers, is akin to protection 
of a nonconforming usc existing at the time that zoning re-
strictions become effective. [10] The same principle under-
lies the rule that a permittee who has expended substantial 
sums under a permit cannot be deprived by a subsequent 
zoning ordinance of the right to complete construction and 
to use the premises as authorized by the permit. (Trans-
Oceanic Oil Corp. v. Santa Barbara, 85 Cal.App.2d 776 [194 
P.2d 148] ; Sandenburgh v. 1Vlichigarnrne Oil Co., 249 Mich. 
372 [228 N.W. 707] ; Atlantic Broadcasting Co. v. Wayne 
Tp., 109 N .• J.L. 442 [162 A. 631]; Nassau-Fulton Realty Corp. 
v. Schlimm, 67 N.Y.S.2d 501; People v. Bales, 224 App.Div. 
87 [229 N.Y.S. 550] .) 
Defendants contend that they are being discriminated 
against on the ground that neighboring owners were granted 
variances and that over half the lands within a radius of the 
intersection of Broadway and Massachusetts A venue were 
being used for heavy industrial purposes. There was a sharp 
conflict in the evidence as to the extent and nature of the 
other nonconforming uses in this area. The trial court made 
no finding on this issue, and the evidence does not establish 
unjust discrimination as a matter of law. No zonng ordinance 
can classify districts with perfect justice. Since cases of 
unusual hardship may require variances, zoning authoritirs 
are usually given power to grant them. [11] The fact that 
variances may have been granted to some owners and denied 
to others, however, does not establish unreasonable discrimi-
nation. [12] 'rhe granting or denial of variances rests 
largely in the discretion of the body designated by the zoning 
ordinance for that purpose, and a denial of a variance will not 
be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of 
discretion. (Rubin v. Board of Directors, 16 Cal.2d 119 [104 
P.2d 1041] ; Otis v. City of Los Angeles, 52 Cal.App.2d 605, 
613 [126 P.2d 954] ; Larkin Co., Inc. v. Schwab, 242 N.Y. 330, 
336 [151 N.E. 637, 639]. As to the degree of discretion 
vested in such bodies, see Lockard v. Los Angeles, 33 Cal.2d 
of the issues 
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Shenk, J., concurred. 
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Have you changed your use our are 
identical." (Italics added.) In other words, defendants were 
engaged in a highly diversified business which embraced sell-
ing, manufacturing, storing and repairing a wide variety of 
things, and to conduct that business, maintained all sorts of 
equipment, huge buildings and tanks. That business is the 
same now as it was prior to 1942. The trial court, taking all 
of these factors into consideration, concluded that the use of 
the gasoline tanks here involved did not constitute a substan-
tial change in the use of the property. Certainly that cannot 
be said to be an tlnreasonable conclusion, yet the majority 
states that it is. By a picayunish selection of trivialities, it 
asserts there was a change of use because the tanks are larger 
than those used formerly and that the fuels stored are to be 
used for sale instead of defendants' use in manufacturing. 
There is evidence that fuel was sold before 1942, but, in any 
event, the change is not substantial considering the extensive 
and diversified character of defendants' operations. The ordi-
nance exempts 1tses existing at the time of its passage. Here 
the evidence shows that the 1tse of defendants' property is the 
same. They are still operating the same business as before 
the adoption of the ordinance. 
There is no sound basis for distinction between this case and 
Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 [25 S.Ct. 18, 49 L.Ed. 
169], where the court held invalid an ordinance barring gas 
works where the property owner had partially erected the 
plant when the ordinance was passed. The court there said 
(p. 239) : "Being the owner of the land and having partially 
erected the works the plaintiff in error had acquired property 
rights and was entitled to protection against unconstitutional 
encroachments which would have the effect to deprive her 
of her property without due process of law." If the right to 
complete a partially built structure is protected, certainly 
there is a constitutionally protected right to continue to 
operate the business exactly the same as before (as the evi-
dence shows). Fuel storage tanks were previously maintained 
on the property. There is no more reason for preventing their 
enlargement than there would be for stopping the completion 
of a gas plant. In fact, this is a stronger case, for here the 
industrial business operations are being continued. The true 
test has been stated: ''The fact that improved or more effi-
cient instrumentalities are utilized in pursuit of the use does 
not exclude it from the category of an 'existing use' within 
a town zoning ordinance permitting the continuance of non-
conforming existing uses, provided the instrumentalities are 
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ordinarily and reasonably adapted to make the use available 
to the owner and the original natut·e and purpose of the 
undertaking remain unchanged. . . . It is a definitely settled 
proposition of law that the 'continuance of a non-conforming 
use' existing at the time of the adoption of the zoning ordi-
nance is a continuance of the same use and not some other 
kind of use. In determining whether a non-conforming use 
was the same before and after passage of a zoning ordinance, 
so as to be permissible, each case must stand on its own facts . 
. . . In a recent New York case where a lot in an area zoned 
for residential purposes was subject to a non-conforming use 
of storage of poles, cable and pipe, the non-conforming use 
related to storage and the storage of any other object was a 
valid continuation of such non-conforming use unless the 
thing stored was vastly different and in itself created new 
problems, in which case it could be considered a change of 
nse." (Emphasis added.) (Yokley, Zoning Law & Practice, 
p. 254.) (See, also, Royal Baking Co. v. Oklahoma City, 182 
Okla. 45 [75 P.2d 1105]; Borough of Cheswick v. Bechman, 
352 Pa. 79 [ 42 A.2d 60] ; President &; Trustees of Ossining 
v. JJieredith, 73 N.Y.S.2d 897; Mcivor v. JJie1·cer-Fraser Co., 
76 Cal.App.2d 247 [172 P.2d 758] .) 
Reference is made to the portion of the ordinance prohibit-
ing structural changes in preexisting buildings. Plainly, that 
provision deals with the change in use of the property which 
would follow from a structural alteration, that is, for example, 
if a residence was so changed that it could be used as a factory. 
The essential factor is still the nature of the use of the prop-
erty. Has that been so altered or extended that the exemption 
for nonconforming uses does not apply? If not, as is the case 
here, there is no violation of the zoning law. 
Finally, it is said that the evidence is highly conflicting 
on whether the ordinance discriminates against defendants, 
but that there is no finding on the subject, and, therefore, 
defendants cannot prevail. There is ample evidence that the 
immediate neighborhood around defendants' property is 
thickly sprinkled with heavy industry and businesses such as 
the storage and sale of fuel. The findings must be liberally 
construed to support the judgment. So construed, there is a 
sufficient finding on the subject. Defendants, in their answer, 
denied that they had violated the ordinance and that the 
ordinance applied to their property. That denial was found 
to be true. They alleged that their use was ''in keeping with 
permits" granted by the county. That was found to be true. 
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